Abstract. We propose a syntax-driven test generation technique to automaticaly derive abstract test cases from a set of requirements expressed in a linear temporal logic. Assuming that an elementary test case (called a "tile") is associated to each basic predicate of the formula, we show how to generate a set of test controlers associated to each logical operator, and able to coordinate the whole test execution. The test cases produced are expressed in a process algebraic style, allowing to take into account the test environment constraints. We illustrate this approach in the context of network security testing, for which more classical model-based techniques are not always suitable.
Introduction
Testing is a very popular validation technique, used in various application domains, and for which several formalizations have been proposed. In particular, a well-defined theory is the one commonly used in the telecommunication area for conformance testing of communication protocols [1] . This approach, sometimes called "model-based" approach, consists in defining a conformance relation [2, 3] between a specification of the system under test and a model of its actual implementation. The purpose of the test is then to decide if this relation holds or not. A practical interest is that test cases can be automatically produced from this specification. Several tools implement this automatic generation technique, e.g. [4] [5] [6] [7] . However, this model-based approach requires a rather complete specification of the system under test, defined on a precise interface level. If this requirement can be fulfilled for specific pieces of software (e.g., a communication protocol), it may be difficult to achieve for large systems, or when the system requirements cannot be encoded as a conformance relation defined on a single interface level. A typical example of such situation is testing a network security policy, where expected properties may rely on the whole network behavior (not on a single component or protocol), and can be tested only by accessing several interface levels.
Test process algebra
To model processes, we define a rather classic term algebra with typed variables, inspired from CCS [9] , CSP [10] and Lotos. We suppose a set of predefined actions Act, a set of types T , and a set of variables Var. Actions are either modifications of variables or communications through channels which are also typed. In the following, we do not address the problem of verifying that communications and assignments are well-typed. We denote by expr τ (resp. x τ ) any expression (resp. variable) of type τ . Thus, when we write x τ := expr τ , we consider that this assignment is well typed.
A test is described as a term of our process algebra. We distinguish between elementary test cases, which are elements of a basic process algebra and compound test cases. We give the syntax and an operational semantics of this test process algebra.
Basic processes
Our basic process algebra allows to describe sequences of atomic actions, communication and iteration. A term of this algebra is called a tile, which are the elementary test components and we note TILE the set of all tiles.
The syntax of tiles and actions is given by the following grammar: where e ∈ T ILE is a tile, b a boolean expression, c a channel name, γ an action, • is the prefixing operator (• : Act × T ILE → T ILE), + the choice operator, and recX : T ILE → T ILE allows recursive tile definition with X a term variable. When the condition b is true, we abbreviate [true]γ by γ. The special tile nil does nothing. There are two kinds of actions (γ ∈ Act). The first ones are the internal actions (modification of variables). The second ones are the communication actions. Two kinds of communications exist: ?c(x τ ) denotes value reception on a channel c which is stored in variable x τ ; !c(expr τ ) denotes the emission of a value expr τ on a channel c. Communication is done by "rendez-vous".
Composing processes
Processes are compositions of tiles. Choices we made about composition operators came from needs appearing in our case studies in network security policies [8] . Composing tests in sequence is quite natural; however, for independent actions, and in order to speed-up test executions, one might want to parallelize some tests executions, for example, if one wants to scan several computers on a network. The parallel composition is also used to model the execution and communication between the test processes and the rest of the system. We assume a set C of channels used by tiles to communicate. We distinguish internal channels (set C in ) and external channels (set C out ), and we have C = C in ∪ C out .
In case of several processes executing in parallel, one might want to interrupt them. We choose to add an operator providing an exception mechanism: it permits to replace a process by an other one on the reception of a communication signal.
So, we define a set of operators, { L , I }, respectively the parallel (with communication through a channel list L ⊆ C), and exception (with an action list I) compositions.
The grammar for term processes (TERM) is:
The parallel operator L (so as the choice operator +) is associative and commutative. It expresses either the interleaving of independant action or the emission !c(expr τ ) of the value of an expression expr τ on a channel c. When the value is received by a process ?c(x τ ), the communication is denoted at the syntactic level by c(expr τ /x τ ). The independent and parallel execution ∅ is noted .
The Join-Exception operator I is used to interrupt a process and replace it with an other when a synchronization/global/communication action belonging to its synchronization list I occurs. Intuitively, considering two processes t, t and a communication action α, t {α} t means that if α is possible, t is replaced by t , else t continues normally.
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Fig. 1. Rules for term rewriting
A runtime environment ρ maps the set of variables to the set of values. We note E the set of all environments. Actions modify environments in a classical way; we note ρ γ → ρ the modification of environment ρ into ρ by action γ. For example, ρ
, where ρ[ρ(exp τ )/x τ ] is the environment ρ in which variable x τ is associated the value ρ(exp τ ). In the following, environments are extended to any typed expression.
A labelled transition system (LTS, for short) is a quadruplet (Q, A, T, q 0 ) where Q is a set of states, A a set of labels, T the transition relation (T ⊆ Q × A × Q) and q 0 the initial state (q 0 ∈ Q). We will use the following definitions and notations: (p, a, q) ∈ T is noted p a −→ T q (or simply p a −→ q). An execution sequence λ is a composition of transitions:
We denote by σ λ (resp. α λ ) the sequence of states (resp. observable actions) associated with λ. The sequence of actions α λ is called a trace. We note by Σ S , the set of finite execution sequences starting from the initial state q 0 of S. For any sequence λ of length n, λ i or λ(i) denotes the i-th element and λ [i···n] denotes the suffix
The semantics of a process is based on a LTS where states are "configurations", pairs (t, ρ), t being a term of the process algebra, ρ an environment, and transitions are given by definition 2. Configurations are used to represent process evolutions. We note C term def = TERM × E the set of configurations.
Definition 1 (Term-transition). A term rewriting transition
is an element of TERM × Act × TERM. We say that the term t is rewritten in t by action α. We note: t α t . This semantics is similar with the CCS one [9] .
Term-transitions are defined in Figure 1 (using the fact that is commutative).
Definition 2 (Transitions).
A transition is an element of C term × Act × C term . We say that the term t in the environment ρ is rewritten in t modifying the environment ρ in ρ .
We have four transition rules, one for an assignment, and three for communication exchange. They are defined in Figure 2 . 
Test execution and test verdicts
As seen in the previous section, the semantics of a test case represented by a T ERM process t is expressed by a LTS S t = (Qthat the behaviour of the System Under Test (SUT) is also modelled by a LTS I = (Q I , A I , T I , q I 0 ). A test execution is then a sequence of interactions between t and the SUT to deliver a verdict indicating whether the test succeeded or not. We first explain how verdicts are computed in our context, and then we give a formal definition of a test execution.
Tiles verdicts
We assume in the following that any elementary tile t i owns at least one variable used to store its local verdict, namely a value of enumerated type V erdict = {pass, f ail, inc}. This variable is supposed to be set to one of these values when tile execution terminates. The intuitive meaning we associate to each of these values is similar to the one used in conformance testing:
• pass means that the test execution of t i did not reveal any violation of the requirement expressed by t i ; • f ail means that the test execution of t i did reveal a violation of the requirement expressed by t i ; • inc means that the test execution of t i did not allow to conclude about the validity of the requirement expressed by t i .
We now have to address the issue of combing the different verdicts obtained by each tile execution of a whole test case.
Verdict management
The solution we adopt is to include in the test special processes (called test controlers) for managing tile verdicts. When tiles end their execution, i.e. have computed a verdict, they emit it toward a designated test controler which captures it. Depending on verdicts received, the controller emits a final verdictand may halt the executions of some tests if they are not needed anymore. The "main" controler then owns a variable v g to store the final verdict.
Test controllers can easily be written in our process algebra with communication operations as shown on the following example. The whole test case is then expressed as a term of our process algebra (with parallel composition and interuptions between processes).
An example of test controller Let us consider a test controller waiting to receive two pass verdicts in order to decide a global pass verdict (in other cases, it emits the last verdict received). Let c v, be the channel on which verdicts are waited. The environment of this controller contains three variables, v for the verdicts received, v g for the global verdict, and N to count numbers of verdicts remaining. An LTS representation is shown in Figure 3 and a corresponding algebraic expression is: Fig. 3 . Verdict controller combining pass verdicts.
Test execution
An execution of a test t (modelled by an LTS S t ) on a SUT (modelled by a LTS I), noted Exec(t, I), is simply expressed as a set of common execution sequences of S t and I, defined by a composition operator ⊗.
) be the sets of states of S t where variable v g is set to pass (resp. f ail, inc):
For λ ∈ Exec(t, I), we define the verdict function: VExec(λ) = pass (resp. fail , inconc) iff there is λ St ∈ Σ pass St (resp. Σ ) and λ I ∈ Σ I such that λ St ⊗ λ I = λ.
Security rules formalization
In a previous work, we carried out a case study to analyse the network security policy in a university environment. This case study gave us a set of security requirements that could be expressed using a simple temporal logic. We give here the syntax and semantics of this logic.
Syntax
A security policy rule is expressed by a logical formula (ϕ), built upon literals. Each literal can be either a condition literal (p c ∈ P c ), or an event literal (p e ∈ P e ). A condition literal is a (static) predicate on the network configuration (e.g., extRelay(h) holds iff machine h is configured as an external relay), and an event literal corresponds to the occurrence of a transition in the network behavior (e.g., enterN etwork(m) holds if message m is received by the network). A conjunction of condition literals is simply called a condition (C), whereas a conjunction of a single event literal and a condition is called a (guarded) event (E). The abstract syntax of a formula is given in Table 1 . The intuitive meaning of these formulae is the following:
-An O-Rule expresses a conditional obligation: when a particular condition holds, then another condition should also hold (logical implication). -An O T -Rule expresses a triggered obligation: when a given event happens, then another condition should hold (or some event should occurs) before expiration of a given amount of time. -An F -Rule expresses an interdiction: when a given condition holds, or when a given event happens, then a given event is always prohibited. 
Semantics
Formulas are interpreted over LTS. Intuitively, a LTS S satisfies a formula ϕ iff all its execution sequences λ do, where condition literals are interpreted over states, event literals are interpreted over labels. We first introduce two interpretation functions for condition and event literals: f c : P c → 2 Q , associates to p c the set of states on which p c holds; f e : P e → 2 A , associates to p e the set of labels on which p e holds. The satisfaction relation of a formula ϕ on an execution sequence λ (λ |= ϕ) is then (inductively) defined as follows:
Finally, S |= ϕ iff ∀λ ∈ Σ S . λ |= ϕ.
Test generation
We define a structural generation function GenT est to convert a rule into the desired combination of elementary tiles with controllers. It associates controllers in such a way that the final verdict is pass iff the rule is satisfied by the SUT. Each controller emits its verdict on a channel, and may uses variables. In the following, new variables and channels will be silently created whenever necessary.
GenT est generates parallel and architecturally independent subtests. Formula semantics is ensured by the controller verdict combinations. Suitable scheduling of subtests is supplied by the controllers through channels used to start and stop subtests (given below by T est function).
Test generation function
A representation on a LTS is shown in Figure 4 . GenT est definition The rule general form is: P l ⇒ M P r where P l , P r ∈ {E, C} are predicates and M ∈ {O, O T , F } a modality. The GenT est function is defined on the rule structure, giving an expression to be instantiated according to the different modalities. We suppose that the final verdict is emitted on the main channel, and t ci , t pe are the tiles respectively associated to elementary predicates c i , p e . 
GenT est(P
l ⇒ M P r ) def = (GenT estP (P l , L l ) GenT estP (Pr, Lr)) L M(Ll, Lr) with L = L l ∪ Lr, L l = {c start l , c
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GenT est P (E, {c start, c stop, c loop, c ver}) 
Li; ∀i ∈ {1 . . . n}, Li = {c start, c stop, c loop, c veri}
Verdict controllers
Several verdict controllers are used in the GenT est definition. Controllers have different purposes. They are first used to manage the execution of subtests corresponding to the components of the rule. For example, for a O T formula, we have to wait for the left-side subtest before starting the right-side subtest. Controllers are also used to "implement" the formula semantics by combining verdicts from subtests.
Controllers definitions are parameterized with channel parameters. We give here an informal description of the controllers, with a graph definition for the more important ones; other controllers are similar (definitions given in appendix). Formula level controllers They emit their verdict on the channel main. Figure 6 . Figure 9 .
O (channel list, channel list). This controller is used to

Soundness proposition
We now express that an abstract test case produced by function GenT est is always sound, i.e. it delivers a fail verdict when executed on a network behavior I only if formula φ does not hold on I. To do this, we follow a very similar approach than in [8] . Two hypotheses are required in order to prove this soundness property:
H1. First, for any formula ϕ, we assume that each elementary test case t i provided for the (event or condition) literals p i appearing in ϕ is strongly sound in the following sense: Execution of t i on SUT I always terminate, and ∀λ ∈ Exec(t i , I)·VExec(λ) = Pass ⇒ λ |= p i ∧(VExec(λ) = Fail ⇒ λ |= p i ). H2. Second, we assume that the whole execution of a (provided or generated) test case t associated to a condition C is stable with respect to condition literals: the valuation of these literal does not change during the test execution. This simply means that the network configuration is supposed to remain stable when a condition is tested. Formally:
λ denotes here tacitly a set of states instead of a sequence.
We now formulate the soundness property: Proposition: Let ϕ a formula, I an LTS and t = GenTest(ϕ). Then: λ ∈ Exec(t, I) ∧ VExec(λ) = f ail =⇒ I |= ϕ.
Application
In this section we apply the GenT est function with two rule patterns taken from the case study presented in [8] .
O-Rule
Consider the requirement "External relays shall be in the DMZ", this could be reasonably understood as "If a host is an external relay, it has to be in the DMZ". A possible modelisation is:
We suppose that somehow we have tiles models for extRelay(h) and inDM Z(h). The GenT est function can be applied on the formula:
stopr, c vr, c loopr}
The definitions of t extRelay(h) and t inDMZ(h) (writing their verdict in their verdict variable (ver)) in our algebra are:
The global test is associated a suitable environment by renaming the two verdict variables of t extRelay(h) and t inDMZ(h) . The new environment contains the following variables: ver 1 for t extRelay(h) , ver 2 for t inDMZ(h) , ver l , ver r for O . t extRelay(h) , and t inDMZ(h) communicate with the controller through channels in L.
O T -Rule
Security policies may also express availability requirements. Consider "When there is a request to open an account, user privileges and resources must be activated within one hour". We formalize this requirement as:
Supposing that there exists a tile for each predicate and that all tiles are independent. One could generate a test from appropriate derivation:
Ls = {c starts, c stops, c loops, c vers}s, s ∈ {l, r, le, lc, re, rc}
Conclusion
We have proposed a test generation technique for testing the validity of a temporal logical formula on a system under test. The originality of this approach is to produce the tests by combinations of elementary test cases (called tiles), associated to each atomic predicates of the formula. These tiles are supposed to be provided by the system designer or a test expert, and, assuming they are correct, it can be proved that the whole test case obtained is sound. The practical interest of this approach is that it can be applied even if a formal specification of the system under test is not available, or if the test execution needs to mix several interface levels. A concrete example of such a situation is network security testing, where the security policy is usually expressed as a set of logical requirements, encompassing many network elements (communication protocols, firewalls, antivirus softwares, etc.) and those behavior would be hard to describe on a single formal specification. The abstract test cases we obtain are expressed in a process algebraic style, and they are structured into test drivers (the tiles), and test controllers (encoding the logical operators). This approach makes them close to executable test cases, and easy to map on a concrete (and distributed) test architecture. Independent parts of the tests can then be executed concurrently. This work could be continued in several directions. First, the logic we proposed here could be extended. So far, the kind of formulae we considered was guided by a concrete application, but, staying in the context of network security, other deontic/temporal modalities could be foreseen, like"interdiction within a delay", or "permission". We also believe that this approach would be flexible enough to be used in other application domains, with other kinds of logical formulae (for instance with nested temporal modalities, which were not considered here). A second improvement would be to produce a clear diagnostic when a test execution fails. So far, test controllers only propagate "fail" verdicts, but it could be useful to better indicate to the user why a test execution failed (which subformula was unsuccessfully tested, and what is the incorrect execution sequence we obtained). Finally, we are currently implementing this test generation technique, and we expect that practical experimentations will help us to extend it towards the generation of concrete test cases, that could be directly executable.
A Complete definitions of controllers
The automaton shown in Figure 7 presents the F (L l , L r ) controller,with: 
B Execution trace of a O-rule generated test
We show a possible execution of this process, the choice considered make extRelay finishing first with f ail. Then, the controller computes an inc verdict, and send it to the user through the channel main. We list here only the term rewritings, and show the evolution of the environment ρ only when it is modified. We start from the test generated from GenT est(extRelay(h) ⇒ O inDM Z(h)). In the following, I l = {?c stop l }, I r = {?c stop r }. 
